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Broadcasting's Fairness Doctrine-AN

ILLOGICAL EXTENSION OF THE RED

LION CONCEPT-Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC
Television and radio advertising is fully accepted in our society as part
and parcel of the American way of life. The business community of this
country spends billions of dollars annually on commercials, attempting to
convince Americans that they have an immediate and pressing need for
products as diverse as panty hose and snow tires, roll-on deodorant and chain
saws. In bad taste to some, boring or amusing to others, one thing these
commercials have not been, is controversial. Should the United States Supreme Court uphold a recent District of Columbia Court of Appeals decision, the day may not be far off when in place of our favorite beer or
Alka-Seltzer commercial, we may find a short anti-war message, perhaps a
pro-busing plug, or even a "get the U.S. out of the U.N."- commercial.
In Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC,' the appellants
sought to buy air time to present an anti-war message to the public. The
network refused, giving as its reason a station policy of refusing to sell air
time to those who sought to present views which were considered to be
controversial in nature. The Federal Communications Commission upheld
this refusal. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that such a policy was an unconstitutional infringement on the first amendment rights of the public.
Television and radio have long been under an obligation to society to air
controversial issues of public importance, and to give both sides of these
issues fair and impartial treatment. This obligation has often been referred
to as the fairness doctrine.2 Until BEM, most networks met their obliga1450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cit. 1971), cert. granted. The proposed announcement urged
the immediate withdrawal of United States forces from South Vietnam. It featured
statements by leading businessmen and retired military officers whose views it was
thought would carry great weight with the general public. Essentially the same issue
was presented in Democratic National Comittee v. FCC, a case considered together
with BEM by the court of appeals. In DNC, the committee had requested air time for
the purpose of informing the general public of the party's views on current issues. The
network's policy of refusing to sell air time to those who sought to present controversial points of view frustrated the committee in this attempt. The party sought a
declaratory ruling by the FCC that
[a] broadcaster may not, as a general policy, refuse to sell time to responsible
entities, such as [the Democratic National Committee], for the solicitation of
funds and for comment on public issues. Id. at 647.
2 In response to two provisions of the Communications Act, the Federal Communications Commission developed the fairness doctrine. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1970) provides

that "[the Commission, if public convenience interest, or necessity will be served
thereby, . . . shall grant to any applicant therefor a station license provided for by this
chapter." 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1970) states the Commission shall determine, in the case of
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tions under the fairness doctrine by confining the coverage of controversial
subjects to news shows and documentaries. 3 The justification for the Government's imposing such an obligation on a privately owned industry is
based upon the scarcity of available broadcast frequencies, and the Government's rationing of those which are available to a select few. 4 The holding of a license to broadcast is considered to be a privilege from the Government for which a corresponding obligation to the general public is owed.5
The constitutionality of the fairness doctrine was recently upheld by the
United States Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC6 In
order to fully understand the action of the court of appeals in BEM, it is
necessary to examine the Supreme Court's decision in Red Lion.
In an attempt to clarify certain aspects of the fariness doctrine, the FCC
'had implemented specific rules concerning personal attacks and political
editorializing by licensees. 7 In Red Lion the constitutionality of these rules
each application filed with it... whether the public interest, convenience and necessity
will be served by the granting of such application, and, if the Commission, upon
examination of such application ...shall find that the public interest, convenience, and
necessity would be served by the granting thereof, it shall grant such application." Thus
the licensee is charged with the responsibility of operating his network or station in
the public interest.
The fairness doctrine is an obligation that the licensee owes the general public. In
essence the licensee simply is charged with the responsibility of presenting to the public
all sides of controversial issues rather than limiting their coverage to only one point
of view. See generally Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
For a comprehensive discussion on the origins of the fairness doctrine, see Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-86 (1969). For favorable comment on the
fairness doctrine see Barron, Access-The Only Choice for the Media? 48 TEXAs L.
REv. 766 (1970); Barron, In Defense of "Fairness": A First Amendment Rationale for
Broadcasting's "Fairness" Doctrine, 37 U. CoLo. L. REV. 31 (1964). For comment
critical of the fairness doctrine, see Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First
Amendment, 10 J. LAw & EcoN. 15 (1967); Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulations, 52 MiNN. L. REv.
67 (1967).
3450 F.2d 642, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The reasons for confining the coverage of controversial issues to news shows and documentaries are obvious. The editing that goes
into these shows and the degree of control exercised over them by broadcasters insure
that cries of "foul" from injured parties under the fairness doctrine are few and far
between.
4See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-14 (1943).
5A license to broadcast confers upon the licensee the temporary privilege of using the
designated frequencies, not the ownership of them. See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970). For
cases supporting this concept, see Ashbaker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 US. 327 (1945);
Television Corp. v. FCC, 294 F.2d 730, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1961); American Bond & Mortgage Co. v. United States, 52 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 538 (1932).
6395 U.S. 367 (1969).
7Id. at 373-74.
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and the fairness doctrine itself were attacked on first amendment grounds.8
The Supreme Court held that the fairness doctrine and the rules the commission had promulgated under it, had the effect of enhancing rather than
abridging freedom of expression, and thus the challenge to the constitutionality of the doctrine failed. 9
It has long been clear that broadcasting is a medium affected by a first
amendment interest. 10 Until the Red Lion case, however, it was the first
amendment rights of the broadcasters and not those of the viewing public
that were considered. The real significance of the Red Lion decision is that
the Court recognized, for the first time, the existence of a first amendment
right in the general public as viewers of television and as listeners of radio
"to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purpose of
the First Amendment." 11 The court of appeal's decision in BEM, if allowed
to stand, will radically change the. nature of this first amendment interest.
In BEM, the court held that the public has a constitutionally protected right
to utilize the medium as potential speakers, by the purchase of advertising
time to present their views regardless of whether they are controversial or
not. 12
Initially at least, one's response to that decision might be favorable. It
appears fully consistent with the freedom of speech positions set forth by
the Supreme Court in Terminiello v. Chicago'3 and the later New York
8The broadcasters alleged that the fairness doctrine and the rules the commission
had promulgated under it abridged their constitutional guarantees of free speech.
Specifically, they contended that the first amendment gave them the right to use their
frequencies in any manner they saw fit and to exclude whomever they should choose.
In short, they were claiming the same right to free speech as broadcasters that the
constitution grants to individual citizens. Id. at 386.
9 "Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there
are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right
to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish"

Id. at 388.

10 See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948). For a discussion of whether the differences in the various characteristics of the media justify
differences in the first amendment standards applicable to them,,see Joseph Burstyn, Inc.
v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952). See also Kalven, Broadcasting Public Policy and
the First Amendment, 10 J. LAW & ECON. 15 (1967); Z. CHAFEE,'GoVERNMENT AND MASS
COMMUNICATIONS (1947).
11395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). To the effect that it is the right of the viewers and
listeners and not the right of the broadcasters which must be given primary considerations, see FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 361 (1955); FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940).
1a 450 F.2d 642, 655 (1971).
13337 U.S. 1 (1948).
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite
dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition
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Times Co. v. Sullivan decision. 14 But upon a closer exaiiination, it is evident that the court in BEM has carried the guarantees of the first amendment too far. It has opened a Pandora's box which neither the networks
nor the FCC are capable of handling. There are three undesirable effects
that the court's decision in BEM might have upon the communications
industry: (1) the decision casts doubt upon the future effectiveness of the
reasonableness standard that is utilized to implement the fairness doctrine,
'(2) the domination of commercial air time by wealthy special interest groups
is now possible, and (3) the decision presages the possible application of the
fairness doctrine to paid, as well as public air time.
Future Effectiveness of the Reasonableness Test in Doubt
To insure compliance with the fairness doctrine, the FCC has utilized a
reasonableness test.15 If the Commission, in reviewing an alleged violation
of the doctrine, finds that the actions of the licensee, from all the surrounding circumstances appear to have been reasonable, they will not interfere
with the network's decision. Should the decision not appear to have been
a reasonable one, the Commission will order the network to make available
certain specific time to the injured party for the purposes of a reply. Thus,
'the initial decision as to whether air time should be given to a particular
point of view is within the discretion of the licensees.' 6 It is one of the
.of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people
to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices
and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute, [citation
'omitted] is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown
likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil ....

Id. at 4.

14 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). There is "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." Id.
at 270.
15 Sde Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1255 (1949). See also
Boalt Hall Student Ass'n, 20 F.C.C.2d 612 (1969); "Democratic State Central Comm.,
19 F.C.C.2d 833 (1968); Madalyn Murray, 40 F.C.C. 647 (1965).
•16 See Note, Fairness Doctrine: Television as a Marketplace of Ideas, 45 N.Y.U.L.

REv. 1222, 1129 (1970). The reasonableness standard presupposes the networks are in
a better position to implement the fairness test than the FCC. Implementation of the
doctrine at this level gives the Commisison two distinct advantages. First, it promotes
a policy of self-regulation by the industry. It does this by appealing to the broadcaster's
sense of professional pride as a joirnalist. Just as a writer-journalist is urged to make
objectivity his goal, television and radio journalists are likewise urged to strive for
objectivity and fairness in their electronic reporting. Second, the factual considerations
that are necessary to determine whether an issue is controversial or not, can-better be
made by the licensee than by the FCC. "Greater scrutiny by the Commission would
involve the tremendous burden of a time-consuming study of the controversial issups
in localities throughout the Nation." Id. at 1229.
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functions of the FCC to give a review of that discretion when requested.
Hence, it is fair to say that it is the networks themselves and not the Commission that have actually implemented the provisions and spirit of the
fairness doctrine. This policy of self-regulation by the industry is in jeopardy
should the court's decision in BEM be allowed to stand.
In BEM, the network involved felt that it could best meet its obligation
to the public to present both sides of controversial issues by limiting the
coverage of these issues to news reports and documentaries. This policy
appears to be sound. It is the networks who make the initial decision as
to whether coverage should be given a particular event. Faced with the possibility of losing their license to broadcast should they fail to meet their
public obligations, the networks closely scrutinize program content to
insure that both sides of issues are shown to the public." When there is
a request for air time, the networks are guided by the principles of the fairness doctrine in reaching a decision. Since they are obligated to keep the
public informed of both sides of important issues it is reasonable to expect
that the networks would want to maintain control of the format that is
utilized to present controversial viewpoints. In holding that the network's
policy was a violation of the constitutional rights of the appellants, the
court was in effect saying that the networks are not8 the best judge as to
the format that these controversial views must take.'
The court's decision in BEM casts doubt on the future effectiveness of
the reasonableness test. The test has as its underlying assumption the belief
that the networks are in a better position to implement the provisions of
the fairness test than either the FCC or the courts.' 9 Since the networks are
part of the community they serve, and as such are closer to the pulse of the
public than a Washington based regulatory agency could be, this assump17 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (4) (1970) provides that the FCC may revoke the license of any
station "for willful or repeated violation of, or willful or repeated failure to observe any
provision of this chapter or any rule or regulation of the Commission authorized by this
chapter . . . ." The problem is that this remedy, for all intents and purposes is too
cumbersome to be of practical value. See Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment:
Observations on Forty Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 Mitr. L. Rxv.

67, 118 (1967).
18 Further, the BEM court, in requiring that some editorial advertising be accepted,

has left unanswered several questions. Who will determine whether or not an issue
is controversial? Once that determination has been made, would the issue be considered controversial everywhere? How many such commercials must the networks
accept to meet this new first amendment obligation to the public? The court seems
to suggest these matters should be handled by the FCC. If this is true the court has
given the FCC a difficult task. It is submitted that these problems could best be
handled by the networks. They are in a better position than the Commission to determine what in their locality is, or is not a controversial issue.
19 See note 16 supra.
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tion seems valid. The court's decision in BEM challenges this assumption
by negating the idea that the network should have control over the particular format that controversial points of view should take on television;
The inability to control program format or to have portions of that format
dictated by the FCC could have serious economic consequences for the television networks.20
BEM is a step in the wrong direction. It represents the taking of some
control over program content from the networks which in turn would make
a policy of self-regulation under the fairness doctrine difficult if not impossible. Actual enforcement of the doctrine would then fall on the FCC. Thus
an already overburdened agency would be asked to assume a job that some
have called "a task of heroic proportions." 21
Dominationof CommercialAir Time by Wealthy Special Interest
Groups Is Possible

Another possible consequence of the court's ruling in BEM is that since
controversial commercials must now be accepted by the broadcasters, there
is nothing to prevent wealthy special interest groups who desire to influence
the public from demanding air time.2 Since BEM was decided only recently, this fear remains largely speculative. Theoretically however, there
is nothing to stop wealthy groups on the fringes of the American political
spectrum from saturating the public with thirty-second spot messages of
hate. Air time is expensive.23 If controversial advertising must be accepted,
it undoubtedly will be given to those who can pay for it. Further, if access
to television for the purposes of presenting controversial points of view
depends solely upon the ability of a party to pay for advertising time, there
is reason to believe that well-financed and influential special interest groups
will dominate air time to the disadvantage of small, underfinanced groups
of concerned citizens whose views on an issue might be contra. As these
citizen groups seem unable to match the power of the wealthy lobbyists on
20 See Note, Fairness Doctrine: Telesdsion as a Marketplace of Ideas, 45 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1222, 1241-42 (1970). But see N. JOHNsON, How To TA BACK To YouR TEI.EvsIoN
SET 65 (1970), to the effect that broadcasters' cries of financial disaster should be taken
with a grain of salt.

21 Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 666 (D.C. Cir.

1971) (McGowan, J., dissenting).
22 The real problem, then, is not that editorial advertising will cost money, but
that it may be dominated by only one group from one part of the political

spectrum. A onesided [sic] flood of editorial advertisements could hardly be
called "robust wide-open" debate which the people have a right to expect on
radio and television. Id. at 664. See also Jaffe, The EditorialResponsibility of the
Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairnessand Access, 85 HARV. L. REv. 769 (1972).
23The cost of a one-minute commercial on television in 1968 was reported to be

$22,000. Time, Vol. 92, July 12, 1968, at 55.
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Capitol Hill, it is doubtful that they could match their purchase of broadcast time to present their views. The public could become so disgusted with
seeing one-sided advertising that pressure would be brought on the Commission to apply the fairness doctrine to paid as well as public air time. This
raises the third and most serious objection to the BEM decision.
Application of the FairnessDoctrine to PaidAs Well As
Public Air Time Is Possible
Since the court in BEM has required the broadcasting industry to sell
some of its air time to those who seek to present controversial views, it is
necessary to consider the implications that this decision might have on the
fairness doctrine. It is logical to assume that if licensees are required to sell
air time to one point of view, they will also be required to offer to sell an
equal amount of time to an opposing point of view. 24 What would happen

if the other side could not afford to pay the amount required? Would the
fairness doctrine compel the licensee to grant free time to the party for the
purposes of a reply? A 1963 Federal Communications Commission ruling
indicates that it would. In Cullman Broadcasting Co.,25 a licensee had sold
air time to a group advocating opposition to the proposed nuclear test ban
treaty. The licensee requested guidance from the Commission as to whether
the fairness doctrine required him to offer free time to a group whose views
on the issue were contrary to those expressed, but who were financially
unable to pay the costs required. The Commission held that the public
interest was best served when all sides of controversial issues were presented.
Accordingly, should one side not be financially able to purchase air time
24

Originally the fairness doctrine dealt solely with controversial issues and was not

applicable to commercial advertising. Should the requirement that controversial issues
be accepted as advertisements be upheld, there is no doubt but that the fairness doctrine
would apply to these "controversial" commercials. The doctrine has always been applied
to controversies. See note 2 supra.
Now there is a trend toward applying the doctrine to any commercial advertising
where there is the possibility of a "controversy" being present. Two recent cases
indicate the extent of that trend. In Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969), popularly known as the cigarette advertising case,
it was held that the danger to health posed by cigarette smoking meant that stations
which carried cigarette advertising were also required to devote a significant amount
of broadcast time to the case against cigarette smoking. Until Friends of the Earth v.
FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971), it was felt that Banzhaf was an exception and that
cigarette advertising was the only instance where the fairness doctrine was held to apply
to commercial advertising. In Friends of the Earth, however, the court held that where
a controversial issue is raised by a commercial advertisement, equal time must be given
to views which are contra. Thus Friends of the Earth answers affirmatively the question of whether or not the fairness doctrine applies to commercial advertising.
25 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963).
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to present a contrasting point of view, it was the duty of the licensee to
offer them free time for purposes of making a reply 2 6
The concept which guided the Commission's ruling in Cullman was the
belief that the public has the right to be informed of all sides of controversial issues. Behind that concept lies a realization by the Commission that
television and radio have the power to influence the minds of their viewers
and listeners. The Commission's reasoning appears to be that it is better for
neither side of an issue to be presented than for only one side to be heard.
With this in mind, it is not difficult to foresee that should the decision in
BEM be allowed to stand, a real possibility exists that broadcasters may be
required to offer free time to financially hard-put members of groups with
opposing points of view.
The BEM decision, coupled with the Cullman ruling, mean that air time
which a broadcaster could offer for sale for commercial advertising purposes
might lhave to be given free of charge to impoverished groups with public
axes to grind. This could have dire economic consequences for the networks
that should not be ignored by the courts. It would have the effect of reducing the licensees' revenues, making it that much more difficult for27 the
network to function efficiently and to meet its other public obligations.
The evolving nature of a democratic society dictates that the concept of
freedom of expression, upon which its existence ultimately depends, should
have a meaning which is capable of change. This flexibility bears a direct
relationship to that society's confidence in itself, its system of government
and its elected leaders. So it is not surprising that from time to time, as
that confidence ebbs and flows, the courts should read new meaning into the
dictates of the first amendment. In the past twenty years, our society's
notions of freedom of expreesion have been drastically altered. This alteration has been in the direction of an expansion of the types of speech and
various modes of communication which have found protection under the
umbrella of the first amendment.
On the whole this expansion of the concept of free expression is laudable.
Yet the process of expansion itself is not limitless. For while the fundamental guarantees of the first amendment must remain unchanged, their
application to specific situations and modes of communication must necessarily vary depending upon the particular type of speech and the structures
of the media utilized. The Supreme Court's recognition in Red Lion of a
constitutional interest in the general public as viewers of television "to have
the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the first
amendment" 28 was a step in the right direction. The court of appeal's
2Gd at 577.
27 See note 16 supra.
28 Red Lion Broadcasting

Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
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decision in BEM to extend this right to the public as potential speakers as
well as viewers was, for the reasons stated above, adventurous and unsound.
The wiser approach would have been to evaluate the network's overall performance in meeting its obligation to keep the public fairly informed by
the methods it had selected. Should a deficiency in the network's performance then be shown, perhaps a requirement that the networks offer free
commercial time to remedy the situation could be justified. If it appeared
that the network was meeting its obligations under both the Federal Communications Act and the fairness doctrine, the better course would be to
leave the station's policy regarding its commercial time alone. As long as
the licensee's duty to the public was being met, the networks themselves,
rather than the Federal Communications Commission or the courts, should
decide the proper broadcast format.
L.R.K.

